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The existing literature on political budget cycles looks at the temptation for 
incumbent governments to run a greater deficit before an election by considering the 
characteristics of the incumbent. We propose here to look at the signals the incumbent 
receives from the voters. For this purpose, we consider the votes from the previous 
national elections and see whether they may influence the incumbent government to 
run a sound fiscal policy or an expansionary fiscal policy.  However,  since 1993 
Europe has been equipped with two fiscal rules: a deficit and a debt ceiling. In this 
context, can we find evidence of a “political budget cycle” before 1993, and did the 
fiscal rules prevent the existence of a “political budget cycle” afterwards? To address 
these questions, we use a cross-sectional time series analysis of European countries 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Equipped with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) should be an effective answer to the costs of expansionary policies  highlighted 
by the Political Budget Cycle (PBC) theory. The SGP was not only designed to prevent 
expansionary fiscal policies across Europe and, hence, assure fiscal sustainability, but 
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also to prevent some countries from free-riding over other countries by running high 
deficits while the taking low interest rates of the well-disciplined countries.
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This paper is more anchored by the sustainability argument from the literature than the 
free-riding analysis. Indeed, the intuition we  want to check is that if political budget 
cycles exist, the SGP should be an effective answer. The PBC theory predicts a recession 
at the beginning of each new term of office and an expansion immediately before the new 
election, with no partisan distinctions. Thus, two aspects are of importance: first, by 
fixing a ceiling, does the SGP prevent a PBC? Second, is the PBC theory this broad, or 
can we find partisan disctinctions? 
  
In Europe, the SGP applies. This fiscal rule contrains governments. One can imagine that 
they have less incentive to use fiscal policy to try to manipulate voters. But, one can also 
imagine that since countries can no longer use monetary policy, either fiscal policy or 
structural policy can be used. Hence, one can try to measure the u se of fiscal policies 
before elections. If governments do not use the fiscal policy, then they will use structural 
policy, which may lead to more ideological electoral campaigns. 
  
Since 1999, the Stability and Growth Pact has imposed a cap on public deficits in Europe. 
Although this rule is applied to the 25 members of the European Union (EU), it is even 
more relevant for the EMU members. 
  
The SGP, in its original definition, is constituted by three components: (1) a political 
commitment by European Union members to commit to a balanced budget in the medium 
term; (2) a preventive arm (the “early warning” procedure); and (3) a repressive arm (the 
fine after any given country breaches the deficit ceiling of 3% GDP and does not come 
back below 3% within the n ext two years) known as the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP). 
 
Many reasons can be found in the economic literature to justify such a fiscal rule. Several 
studies focus on these topics, many of which examine the effects of fiscal policy and 
budget deficits on structural variables such as unemployment and growth. A short and 
incomplete list of such studies includes Blanchard, Barro, or Bernheim (Barro, 1989, 
Bernheim, 1989, Blanchard, 1985). Other researchers deal with the question of the 
sustainability of the budget deficit. This group includes Nielsen, Bohn, Perotti, Strauch et 
al., or Mongelli  (Bohn, 1995, Mongelli, 1999, Nielsen, 1992, Perotti, et al., 1998). In 
1999, Amador emphasized the role of fiscal policy and the behavior of the budget deficit 
and the public debt over time (Amador, 1999). An important feature of this model was in 
the definition of sources of uncertainty as stochastic processes. It also used stochastic 
optimization methods where it is assumed that taxation endogenously adjusts fiscal 
imbalances (Turnovsky, 1992, Turnovsky, 1996).  
 
With Greece, which never abided by the Pact, and France and Germany which breached 
it in 2002, 2003, and 2004 without being fined, the SGP needed new credibility. Many 
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options were proposed to save the moribund SGP. On March 23rd, 2005, the European 
Council agreed in unanimity to introduce some flexibility into the SGP, creating de facto 
a “SGP II.” This flexibility is introduced via the concept of “relevant factors,” which are 
country specific. The factors will be relevant only if the European Council rules 
accordingly.  
 
From a practical perspective, with Germany and France representing almost half of the 
population of the EMU, it is tough to believe that the breach of the SGP was justified by 
free-riding reasons, for instance. The incapacity of the German and French governments 
to implement structural reforms that would prevent the use of automatic fiscal stabilizers 
seems to be a more plausible assumption.  
 
Figure 1. Public deficits as a percentage of GDP 








Figure 2. Public debt as a percentage of GDP 
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Since the SGP is a macroeconomic management rule, the main actor is the government.  
It is reasonable to assume that the government acts under constraints, one of them being 
the will of the population. The goal of this empirical paper is to look at whether electoral 
behaviors have an impact on the reason why some governments use a loose fiscal policy. 
We use a cross-sectional time-series analysis of the 14 EU members (including 12 EMU 
members) based on Arellano and Bond’s methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We 
look at the change in electoral behaviors as a proxy to capture the population’s will in 
terms  of fiscal and structural reforms. The dataset is constituted by data from  the 
AMECO database, as well as data covering European national elections from 1979 to 
2005. 
 
This paper examines whether there really exists a PBC in EU member countries, as well 
as whether there is a partisan distinction. Combining both questions is not new in the 
literature  (Mink and de Haan, 2005).  Unlike  Mink and de Haan ( 2005), we do not 
consider the timing of an election, but rather an election dummy variable to consider 
election years, as well as the votes for political parties in national elections. In contrast to 
Buti and van den Noord (2003) and von Hagen (2003), we use a multivariate model as in 
Mink and de Haan (2005). 
 
The partisan effect is when an incumbent government from one party is more likely to act 
according to the PBC predictions. We use political votes for national elections and not 
the number of seats in the national institutions to look at a potential partisan effect in the 
sense that the incumbent government may prefer to base its future fiscal policy on the 
citizens’ perceptions expressed through the context of national elections. This approach 
does not challenge for instance Mink and de Haan (2005), but complements the existing 
literature by asking the following question: is a government from one party more likely to 
adapt its fiscal policy in light of the citizens’ latest votes? Moreover, the use of votes   9
instead of the number of seats is interesting for an identification reason: it seems to be a 




2.  Review of the literature 
 
 
The origins of the Political Business Cycle concept 
 
By making an anachronism, it is easy to (re)-define nowadays a political business cycle, a 
political monetary cycle, and a political budget cycle. The political business cycle would 
explain the expansionary use of the national policy instruments (monetary and fiscal 
policies mainly) by the incumbent government to stimulate the economy before a major 
election. The political monetary cycle could be a notion applied to the explicit use of the 
monetary policy. The political budget cycle is in fact the notion applied to the explicit use 
of the fiscal policy. In fact, the political monetary cycle is a notion that does not exist, 
and is always  confused with the political business cycle. The only two notions the 
literature use nowadays are the political business cycle to refer to the use of monetary 
policy, and the political budget cycle to refer to the use of the fiscal policy. 
 
These models stress the incumbent’s intent to maximize his expected vote share at the 
next election through the use of an expansionary monetary policy before the elections 
(Nordhaus, 1975). The assumption is that politicians attempt to create the most desirable 
economic conditions before elections to appeal to identified groups, although after the 
elections those policies may require costly adjustments. Alesina (1989) explains that the 
economy is overstimulated before the elections with expansionary policies and short-
sighted voters reward the incumbent government, without realizing that a recession will 
be needed after the election to reduce inflation. As a consequence, there is an economic 
cycle that is generated by the elections timing, or in other words, the political cycle. In 
this context, the timing of macroeconomic policy is artificially affected by the timing of 
elections (Alesina, 1989). Moreover, the economy faces its “natural” economic cycles as 
well as politically generated cycles.  
 
As summarized by Alesina (1989), Nordhaus' (1975) approach was refined by Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff (1987), and  Rogoff and Sibert (1988). Starting with the 
political business cycle, the theory evolved into the “rational political business cycle” 
theory. They extend Nordhaus' (1975) theory to rational voters, while explaining the 
existence of political cycles as sufficiently complicated budgetary process, which can, at 
least temporarily, fool voters. A second enhancement of the PBC theory is the “partisan 
theory” (PT) that was initiated by Hibbs (1977), based upon the assumption that left-wing 
parties prefer, on average, higher inflation a nd lower unemployment than right-wing 
parties. The third refinement is known as the “rational partisan theory” (RPT) proposed 
by  Alesina (1987), and Alesina and Sachs (1988). According to this view, a left-wing 
party cannot “credibly” commit itself to fighting unemployment while keeping a low-
inflation rate. Indeed, if expected inflation was “low,” this government would create an   10
inflation surprise in order to reduce unemployment. One reason is the problem of time-
inconsistency described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
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From “Political Business Cycle” to “Political Budget Cycle” 
 
Another set of transformations was more technical than semantic, and concerned the 
political business cycle created by the use of fiscal policy for electoral reasons. Two 
categories can be drawn. The first category of models is called “adverse selection-type 
models” by Shi and Svensson (2004). They are built upon the assumption of asymmetries 
between the electorate and the politicians. The first of these models is created by Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988). Voters want to elect the more competent
3 politician and form rational 
expectations regarding the incumbent’s type based upon observable current fiscal policy 
outcomes. Before the election, the high-type incumbent will attempt to signal his type 
(and thereby increase his chances of re-election) by engaging in expansionary fiscal 
policy, which is less “costly” for him than it is for the low-type. This leads to a pre-
election increase in the government deficit when a competent politician is in office. As 
pointed out by Shi and Svensson (2004), some of the implications of the signaling models 
seem to be at odds with both empirical and anecdotal evidence. For example, only the 
more competent politician (rather than the less competent one) distorts the economy in 
the separating equilibrium of the signaling game. Likewise, only competent politicians 
will be re-elected. Furthermore, since only competent types signal by creating a boom 
before an election, the testable implications are unclear without additional information on 
the (unobservable) type of the incumbent. 
 
Based on moral hazard,  the  second category of models will try to prevent these 
inconveniences.  Persson and Tabellini ( 2000) and  Shi and Svensson ( 2002) are 
precursors to these models, and  assume that each  politician has some competence. 
Obviously those public goods can also be increased by  expanding the public deficit 
without making particular efforts to maximize the public goods supply. Voters are 
rational, but infer the competence level of the politician only from the supply of public 
goods. As a result, temptation exists from the incumbent government perspective to raise 
the deficit and supply more public goods to signal greater competence. 
 
In a moral hazard framework, apart from electoral influences, Mink and de Haan (2005) 
take two factors into account in their empirical model that are not controlled by policy 
makers, but affect fiscal policy outcomes. First, they include the output gap as a proxy for 
the business cycle. Second, since unforeseen economic developments may affect fiscal 
policy outcomes, they  include the difference between actual and expected real GDP 
growth. But the main contribution of this paper in light of our topic is that the authors 
study the PBC in the context of the SGP. Their results are in line with the moral hazard 
models. In the European framework, one finds contradictory results. On one side, 
Andrikopoulos, et al. ( 2004) investigated whether there  is evidence of incumbent 
governments manipulating fiscal policies in order to increase their odds in the future 
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elections: they did not find such results after a thorough empirical study covering the 
years 1970-1998. On the other side, Buti and van den Noord (2003) analyzed the fiscal 
policies over the 1999-2002 period and found some evidence of expansionary fiscal 
policies motivated by the near elections. This result is confirmed by  von Hagen (2003) 
who concludes that there is evidence that fiscal policies were used during the period 
1998-2002 before elections. 
 
It should be no surprise that  incumbent governments switched from  using  monetary 
policy to fiscal policy. In the context of the Economic and Monetary Union, countries 
were losing monetary policy as a policy instrument. This argument holds not only for the 
period starting in 1999, but also for the convergence period from 1993 to 1998, and more 
specifically for the last two years of this period (1997 and 1998) within which countries’ 
performance  was evaluated for the entry into the EMU. However, to  prevent fiscal 
unsustainability the EU was equipped with the SGP. At first glance, it is surprising that 
incumbent governments would breach the fiscal rule to increase the likelihood of re-
election, but when one considers that monetary policy is no longer an option, the only 
remaining instrument is fiscal policy. 
 
In light of these developments, we propose to look at the public deficits across 14 
European countries, and see whether the deficits can be explained by a multivariate 
model comprising economic and political variables. Compared to the existing literature, 
we do not capture the existence of the PBC through the computation of an election 
variable, but through the votes expressed during national elections in the different 
countries. We do not use the results of the elections, but the votes going to each party in 
order to prevent the noise in the data created by the different electoral systems across 
countries. Indeed this noise is the difference between the percentage of votes, and the 
number of seats controlled in the national legislatures. 
 
 
3.  Model 
 
 
As in  Shi and Svensson ( 2002), we use fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP, and government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Shi and Svensson (2002) provide an empirical analysis of political budget cycles based 
on a large panel of countries. They find political budget cycles to be a universal 
phenomenon, a result that generalizes previous empirical findings based on smaller data 
sets. The empirical cross-country literature on political budget cycles has three common 
features. First, it is based on data sets from a relatively small number of countries; second, 
it focuses on identifying whether or not there exists any electoral effects on fiscal policy; 
and third, it treats the timing of elections as exogenous. 
   12
The latest developments in the literature help distinguish between outcomes due to 
deliberate policy choices and unobserved events that are confounded with both the timing 
of elections and fiscal policies. 
 
However, those papers face concerns that in countries where political competition is 
restricted and elections can be manipulated, elections may not have the same effect on 
fiscal policies as in other, more democratic, countries. This is why we use the votes for 
parties instead of the outcome of elections in terms of seats. We block the noise created 
by the various electoral laws across countries which define the number of seats controlled 




This paper assembles a panel data set consisting of 14 countries over a 27-year period 
(1979-2005). The data allow us to study whether actual votes – and not parties elected – 
have effects on public deficits across countries, and the inception of the Stability and 
Growth Pact has reduced the Political Budget Cycle. 
 
The reference database for economic variables is AMECO (compiled by the European 
Commission). Political data from 1979-1999 comes from Perrineau, et al. (2002) and data 
after 1999 comes from Turner (2006).  We apply party classifications from the European 
Parliament to national parties.  Parties are coded from the following types, and electoral 
data is compiled accordingly (see appendix 1 for an explanation of the classification 
methodology):  
 
•  European Unitary Left (GUE), formerly COM—socialist and communist 
•  Party of European Socialists (PSE), formerly PDS and SOC—social democratic 
and socialist 
•  Greens in the European Parliament (V), formerly ARE, RAD, ARC, and CDI 
•  European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (ELDR), formerly LD—liberal 
and centrist 
•  European People’s Party (PPE), formerly PSD, UDF, and EPP—Christian 
democratic and conservative  
•  The Union for Europe (UPE), formerly CDS-PP, RDE, and DEP—conservative         
•  Non-affiliated (NI)—extreme right 
 
We computed these variables: 
 
•  Pop. 15-64/total (national accounts) 
•  Pop. over 65/total (national accounts) 
•  Total revenue (% GDP) 
•  Total tax burden excluding imputed social security contributions (% GDP) 
•  Social contributions (% GDP) 
•  Social benefits other than social transfers in kind: general government (% GDP) 
•  Social transfers in kind (% GDP) 
•  Deficit (% GDP)   13




The panel structure offers different advantages for the empirical analysis of individual 
behaviour. One of the most important features is that econometric techniques based on 
the combination of the cross-sectional and the time dimension of the data allow us to take 
into account the effect of variables not explicitly observed, for example time invariant 
individual-specific effects. For this reason, panel data techniques are more robust with 
respect to incomplete model specification. In particular, they provide an easy solution to 
the problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
 
All the variables – but the lagged party variables – are control variables.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
year  378  1992  7.799204  1979  2005 
gue  316  11.98813  9.929946  0  34.7 
pse  316  24.99409  11.25568  0  45.1 
           
v  316  4.24193  4.945133  0  22.2 
eldr  316  11.70734  11.74335  0  42.6 
ppe  316  21.2702  16.60478  0  48.8 
upe  316  17.86521  20.83097  0  67.23314 
ni  315  5.314673  7.442166  0  27.5 
           
electyear  336  .2232143  .4170219  0  1 
pop1564  351  66.28995  2.051991  58.8162  69.75991 
popover65  324  21.32143  2.416817  16.39586  28.66794 
           
socialcont  335  12.93771  5.012757  1.603669  23.55911 
socbenefit  335  15.53966  3.004598  6.065574  24.13123 
soctransfers  316  11.37093  3.963232  2.125163  20.90909 
           
deficitgdp  335  -3.071742  4.141421  -15.7289  7.095311 
debtinter  335  4.8745  3.682511  .1841621  16.95652 
 
Panel data models can either be static or dynamic. In this context, static means that the 
dependent variable is expressed as a function of other contemporaneous variables. 
Dynamic panel techniques allow the explanatory variables to have both a short-run and a 
long-run impact on the variables of interest. We do both. Equation (1) is a standard panel 
data specification: 
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Where  , it def  is the public deficit outcome in country  i  and year  t ,  , it pol  a vector of 
political variables,  , it w  a vector of control economic variables,  , it ELE  an election dummy 
variable,  i x  an unobserved country-specific effect,  t x  an unobserved time effect, and  , it e  
an i.i.d error term. 
 
However, the likely presence of country-specific effects and the time-specific effects 
render the Ordinary Least Squares estimator to be biased. In order to identify whether a 
random effects versus fixed effects specification was appropriate, a hausman test was run 
for the entire data set, and the fixed effects model was more appropriate.  We then 
generated time dummies and tested for fixed effects. We concluded that our fixed effect 
regressions should include time effects.  Fixed-effects estimators can eliminate the 
country-specific effect as well as the time-specific effect. 
 
We also run a dynamic panel data analysis. This requires the introduction of the lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable. We do it to test for hysteresis phenomena 
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However, the i nclusion of lagged dependent variables causes a bias. The bias of the 
fixed-effects estimator, which influences all variables, is a function of  T  and only when 
T ﬁ¥ will the fixed-effect estimator be consistent (Kiviet, 1995, Nickell, 1981). 
 
Introducing a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable causes different 
problems. Biased estimators are one example. One way to solve this problem is by first 
differencing the model and then using OLS. However, even if there is no autocorrelation 
in the error term in levels, the error term in first differences is correlated with the first 
differences of the lagged dependent variable (Shi and Svensson, 2002). 
 
The  GMM estimator is an interesting method because it controls for the unobserved 
country-specific effects, the time-specific effects, as well as the bias caused by the lagged 
dependent variables. We adopt the GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel data by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). 
 
By definition this estimator generates a large number of instruments. To test the validity 
of over-identifying restrictions, a Sargan Test or Hansen Test can be applied (Hansen, 
1947). 
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The key idea is to find instrumental variables that correlate with the explanatory variables, 
but not with the error term. 
 
To eliminate the country-specific effects as well as the time-specific effects, we can take 
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Where  ,,,1 ititit defdefdef - =- V . Arellano and Bond (1991) note that under the assumption 
that the error term  , it e  is not serially correlated, values of  def  lagged two periods or 
more are valid instruments for the transformed lagged dependent variables  ,1 it def - V . For 
the control variables, we assume that  , it w  is weakly exogenous; that is,  , it w  is 
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term. Thus the GMM dynamic first-
difference estimator uses the following linear moment conditions: 
 
  ,, 0 itsit Edef e - Øø = ºß V   for 2,3,... stT ‡=   (4) 
  ,, 0 itsit Ew e - Øø = ºß V     for 2,3,... stT ‡=   (5) 
 
The election indicator  , it ELE  is assumed to be strictly exogenous, and we therefore use 
, it ELE V  as its own instrument in equation (3). 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
 
We have results for four different periods: first the 1979-2005 period; second before the 
beginning of the convergence period in 1993; third the convergence period from 1993 to 
1998; and fourth after the inception of the euro in 1999. 
 
We look at these data from three different methodological frameworks: first is a standard 
OLS to help specify the model; second is the fixed effects model to take care of the fixed 
effects; and third is the dynamic panel approach to capture hysteresis phenomena in the 
public deficit across countries. 
 
For checking the validity of the Arellano-Bond method, we consider two tests. The first is 
a Sargan test of over-identification, where the null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residuals. Due to the numerous lagged party variables, the GMM 
model is always over-identified. This is less of an issue here since the GMM-in-
difference method is used as a complement. The second one, the Arellano-Bond test, is a 
test of the assumption of no serial correlation (in levels), on which the moment conditions 
(equations (4) and (5)) rely. This test is implemented as a test of second-order serial   16
correlation in the difference equation  (3), and the null assumption is always rejected, 
confirming the absence of auto-correlation. 
 
Let us comment on the control variables with the fixed effects model on the one hand. 
We consider first t he overall period 1979-2005 (see table 2 ) to validate our model 
specifications. Thus,  it is  reassuring to notice the constant result through the three 
approaches that debt interest has a negative sign, which shows that countries facing a 
higher payment in terms of debt interest will face a greater deficit (deficits are compiled 
with negative values). Another constant and validating result is that total tax revenue has 
a positive sign: the greater the total tax revenue, the lower the deficit. Now, it is 
interesting to notice that total tax burden has a negative sign. The difference between 
total tax burden and total tax revenue is social contributions. In other words, it seems that 
countries raising higher social contributions are also likely to face a higher pressure on 
their public finances. Although demographic variables seem to matter for the overall 
period (see table 2), they are no longer significant when we look at the breakdown of the 
overall period (see tables 3, 4, and 5), which is evidence of the overwhelming effect over 
the other variables of the Treaty of Maastricht for the period 1993-1998 (see table 4), and 
the SGP for the period starting in 1999 (see table 5). 
 
Table 2. Results 1979-2005 [Double-Lin specification] 
Dependent variable: Public deficit excluding interest. Mean: -3.071742  Std. Dev.: 4.141421 
Variable  OLS  FE  Difference GMM 
Public deficit excluding interest (year-1)  N/A  N/A  0.2901073** 
Debt interest  -0.7353026**  -0.4506805**  -0.2571037** 
Total tax revenue  0.6321491**  0.7458246**  0.7122313** 
Total tax burden  -0.0530384**  -0.0945493**  -0.0664641** 
Population over 15-64 (% of whole pop.)  0.179106  0.3295331**  -0.2011333 
Population over 64 (% of whole pop.)  0.6362052**  0.7783252**  0.0095185 
GUE parties (year-1)  -0.0848992**  0.0913666*  0.0280832 
PSE parties (year-1)  -0.0626988**  -0.0107557  0.022431 
Green (V) parties (year-1)  0.0153188  -0.0993946**  -0.0571948* 
ELDR parties (year-1)  -0.0166451  0.2031895**  0.0574407 
PPE parties (year-1)  0.1399689**  -0.049742  0.0141678 
UPE parties (year-1)  -0.0013305  -0.0263433  -0.0021015 
NI parties (year-1)  0.0126051  0.0068341  0.0184033 
Election year (dummy)  0.159003  0.2510141  0.2195777 
Social benefits  -1.609457**  -1.752802**  -1.360227** 
Social transfers  0.1355616**  -0.43191**  -0.5501649** 
Social contributions  0.1076007*  -0.0952666  -0.011923 
       
** .01 significance level    Sargan test:  0.99 
* .05 significance level   
Arellano-
Bond test:  0 
 
On the other hand, let us comment on the political variables within the fixed effects 
model specification. For the overall period 1979-2005 (see table 2), it is remarkable to 
notice that we find evidence of the attraction of the median voter. ELDR parties are   17
center-right and center-left parties. T he greater the vote they receive in the previous 
national elections, the lower the public deficit run by the incumbent government. Another 
interesting result is that the greater the votes to the Green parties for the previous 
elections, the bigger the deficit decided by the incumbent government before the next 
national elections. Even more interesting is the fact that the greater the votes captured by 
the extreme left parties during the previous elections, the lower the public deficit decided 
by the incumbent government is. Thus extreme parties’ votes seem to not influence 
public finances policies decided by the democratic parties. 
 
Table 3. Results before 1993 [Double-Lin specification] 
Dependent variable: Public deficit excluding interest. Mean: -4.341804    Std. Dev.: 4.587443  
Variable  OLS  FE  Difference GMM 
Public deficit excluding interest (year-1)  N/A  N/A  0.230757** 
Debt interest  -1.016209**  -0.68923**  -0.545235** 
Total tax revenue  0.4989827**  0.50119**  0.5300141** 
Total tax burden  -0.082907**  -0.02244  -0.0052663 
Population over 15-64 (% of whole pop.)  1.153337**  1.011536  0.2563396 
Population over 64 (% of whole pop.)  0.225908  0.332719  -0.1591016 
GUE parties (year-1)  -0.2382814**  0.179599  0.048839 
PSE parties (year-1)  -0.1015125*  -0.07977  -0.1747692 
Green (V) parties (year-1)  -0.104388  0.00445  -0.0508214 
ELDR parties (year-1)  -0.1845807**  0.002691  0.114676 
PPE parties (year-1)  0.1319536**  0.286617*  0.1760885 
UPE parties (year-1)  0.0144682  -0.00765  0.0217567 
NI parties (year-1)  -0.0242687  -0.0396**  0.3726668 
Election year (dummy)  -0.2567557  0.140356  -0.0046684 
Social benefits  -2.180374**  -1.97358**  -1.607572* 
Social transfers  -0.003857  0.181658  0.0139641 
Social contributions  0.3190721**  0.564398  0.3970426 
       
** .01 significance level   
Sargan 
test:  0.97 
* .05 significance level   
Arellano-
Bond test:  0.0001 
 
Another noteworthy result comes from the breakdown of the overall period into the three 
periods: before 1993, 1993-1998, and after 1998. First, before 1993 (see table 3), 
governments did not have to abide by specific rules such the Treaty of Maastricht or the 
SGP. Interestingly enough, this time, the greater the right-wing parties’ (PPE) votes, the 
lower the public deficit, showing a move rightward of the hunt for the median voter. For 
the extreme-right votes, the greater the votes in previous elections, the bigger the deficit. 
It is as if incumbent governments try to provide a social response to the people who, most 
of the time, vote for right-wing parties in Europe to express their anger at the middle. 
  
So far, although we use a different approach, our results are in line with the Political 
Business Cycle theory and, more specifically, with the Partisan Theory showing that 
incumbent governments react in various ways to votes expressed during previous national 
elections. Now what about the period after 1993 when incumbent governments faced two   18
challenges: first the implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht, and second the 
implementation of the SGP? If those international  constraints are stronger than the 
political pressures created by the internal political business cycle, then votes to parties 
should not influence the fiscal policies of incumbent governments in charge of pushing 
their countries towards the EMU. This intuition is indeed confirmed by our results (see 
tables 4 and 5): votes during previous national elections are no longer influential with 
regard to the choice of fiscal policies. The PBC was hindered by the Treaty of Maastricht 
and the SGP. 
 
Table 4. Results 1993-1998 [Double-Lin specification] 
Dependent variable: Public deficit excluding interest. Mean: -3.478863 Std. Dev.: 3.303119 
Variable  OLS  FE  Difference GMM 
Public deficit excluding interest (year-1)  N/A  N/A  -0.0616551 
Debt interest  -0.72002**  -0.79687**  -0.6359416* 
Total tax revenue  0.783326**  0.561949**  0.7289299** 
Total tax burden  -0.06547**  -0.18813*  -0.123685 
Population over 15-64 (% of whole pop.)  0.217007  0.801092  -0.1171404 
Population over 64 (% of whole pop.)  1.024729**  1.385616*  -0.1139736 
GUE parties (year-1)  -0.16085**  -0.16546  -0.09133 
PSE parties (year-1)  -0.05892  -0.11808  -0.0389302 
Green (V) parties (year-1)  0.093753  -0.05316  0.0918641 
ELDR parties (year-1)  -0.00354  0.115363  0.0308189 
PPE parties (year-1)  0.244204**  0.216776  0.1852269 
UPE parties (year-1)  0.075558**  -0.35192  -0.5356991 
NI parties (year-1)  -0.07544*  0.354078  0.5042425 
Election year (dummy)  0.301948  0.841733  0.134539 
Social benefits  -1.65321**  -1.46394**  -1.238511** 
Social transfers  0.288848**  0.831821*  0.4914072 
Social contributions  -0.03409  0.00482  -0.2416815 
       
** .01 significance level    Sargan test:  1 
* .05 significance level   
Arellano-
Bond test:  0.0025 
 
The GMM approach was used as a means to check for the relative  influences of the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the SGP. In other words, we try to see which constraint, the 
Treaty of Maastricht or the SGP, has a greater magnitude on the choice of fiscal policies 
by incumbent governments. This approach is also used as a complement to the fixed 
effects model in order to check for the presence, or not, of a structural public deficit. 
What is remarkable from the GMM results is that there seems to be a structural public 
deficit before the convergence period, but both between 1993 and 1998 and after 1998, 
public deficit excluding interest is no longer significant at 5%. Indeed under the Treaty of 
Maastricht, countries had to reduce their deficits and had a strong incentive to do so: the 
accession into the EMU. Under the Stability and Growth Pact, countries have to abide by 
the Pact to avoid fines, but the threat, although strong in 1999, was much weaker in 2004 
when Germany and France were not fined by the European Union. This seems to be 
corroborated by the data at a significance level of 10%. Indeed at 10%, lagged public   19
deficit between 1993 and 1998 has a negative sign, meaning that a high deficit in the 
previous years forces countries to reduce the deficit in the following year (see table 4). 
The reason for this is, likely, for the countries to comply with the Treaty of Maastricht. 
But one can also note that after 1998, lagged public deficit is significant at 10% with a 
positive sign. This shows the presence of a structural component of the deficit: a greater 
deficit in previous years leads to a greater deficit in the following years. In other words, 
the SGP is less of an incentive to reduce the deficit than the Treaty of Maastricht (see 
table 5). 
 
Table 5. Results after 1998 [Double-Lin specification] 
Dependent variable: Public deficit excluding interest. Mean: -.7223197 Std. Dev.: 2.870706 
Variable  OLS  FE  Difference GMM 
Public deficit excluding interest (year-1)  N/A  N/A  0.0607197 
Debt interest  -0.25571  -0.43177  0.0061564 
Total tax revenue  1.33755**  1.416924**  1.130645** 
Total tax burden  -0.08291**  -0.26025**  -0.1700705** 
Population over 15-64 (% of whole pop.)  0.740259**  -0.65197  -1.037151 
Population over 64 (% of whole pop.)  -0.14818  0.284171  0.239956 
GUE parties (year-1)  0.022665  0.115432  0.1055479 
PSE parties (year-1)  0.011831  0.050452  0.0550085 
Green (V) parties (year-1)  -0.14205  -0.1555  -0.106288 
ELDR parties (year-1)  -0.20291**  -0.07231  -0.0957179 
PPE parties (year-1)  0.086039  -0.03391  -0.0087853 
UPE parties (year-1)  -0.07067**  -0.05567  -0.006372 
NI parties (year-1)  -0.0396  0.117731  0.128599* 
Election year (dummy)  -0.05757  0.118412  0.2164624 
Social benefits  -2.26316**  -2.35685**  -2.041319** 
Social transfers  0.728492**  0.304929  -0.4909033 
Social contributions  -0.28284*  -0.07672  0.0328927 
       
** .01 significance level    Sargan test:  1 
* .05 significance level   
Arellano-
Bond test:  0.0329 
 
 
5.  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
 
Our results confirm that there is a political budget cycle across countries in Europe for 
the period 1979-2005, although internal political pressures  are overwhelmed by the 
constraints imposed on fiscal policies by the Treaty of Maastricht and the consecutive 
rule: the SGP. Using the election year dummy, Mink and de Haan (2005) find strong 
evidence that the SGP has not restricted fiscal policy makers in the euro area from 
pursuing expansionary policies before elections. Thus, an extension of this result is that 
the breach of the SGP by Germany and France can be explained by moral hazard 
behaviors in those countries – one of the rationales for the creation of the SGP. Our 
results concern a broader period and are slightly different. Using votes from national   20
elections instead of the election year dummy à la Mink and de Haan (2005), we find 
strong evidence that before the Treaty of Maastricht, Europe faced a PBC, yet after 1993, 
the discipline imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht was stronger than the PBC. This holds 
true for the period starting in 1999 with the implementation of the SGP, although the SGP 
is less constraining than the Treaty of Maastricht. It is likely that in a couple of years, 
after which we can include more observations, we will find evidence that the SGP 
without the enforcement of the Excessive Deficit Procedure has not prevented the 
appearance of a new PBC. 
 
The differences between Mink and de Haan (2005) results and ours can be explained by 
the fact that these authors consider the 1999-2004 period for euro members, when we 
control for periods prior the implementation of the SGP, and prior to the implementation 
of the Treaty of Maastricht. Our sample of countries is also wider than the euro members 
in order to control for countries with fewer constraints than the euro members. 
 
In retrospect, our results are numerous. First, they are in line with the intuition as well as 
the goals of the Treaty of Maastricht and the SGP. Second, the breaching of the SGP by 
some member countries is not based on free-riding but rather moral hazard behaviors. 
Third, from a methodological perspective, using votes for national elections is an 
effective complement to the election year dummy as used in the existing literature (Mink 
and de Haan, 2005). Fourth, we find strong evidence for the existence of a structural 
budget deficit. Fifth, and perhaps more importantly, the SGP is less of a constraint than 
the Treaty of Maastricht. This calls for the actual enforcement of the EDP if one wants to 
prevent the occurrence of PBC, though indeed, further research is needed to ascertain 
which is least harmful: the PBC or the SGP?   21
 
Appendix 1.  The Classification of Political Parties 
 
The classification schema we have used consists of three stages, each of which controls 






Party “A” from state “C” is a member of the GUE party in the European legislature.  





Party “B” from state “C” has the same left-right spectral classification as party “A” (e.g. 




Party “D” from state “E” is classified as an extreme left/communist party  




Stage one uses data compiled by (Perrineau, et al., 2002), which breaks down EP makeup 
(1979-1999) by state, party, and the European Party groups (i.e. GUE, PSE, V, ELDR, 
PPE, UPE, and NI).  Given that not all national parties are represented in the EP, stage 2 
uses parallel coding which assumes that parties having duplicate left-right spectral 
classifications would be members of the same supranational parties. Finally, because 
some parties were both unrepresented in the EP and have no national party duplicates, 
stage 3 classifies parties with respect to the (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999) typology of 
supranational parties.
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